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TRENDS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR FISCAL CHOICES
Roy Bahl

L INTRODUCTION

Roy Bahl is Professor of Economics

!)!f:

and

The 1980s were difficult for Latin America. Per capita real GNP increased by only < Director of the Policy Research Center,: •
$ 30 (1.5 percent),' and ten of the 27 countries in the region had a lower per capita GNP • Georgia State University/Atlanta,
, Georgia. He is indebted to Professor. : >,
in;i989 than they had iii 1980.* Between 1981 and 1985, there was virtually no growth
Jorge Martinez for a number of helpful
in the region. The situation did hot improve markedly in the early 1990s. Per capita
comments.
real GNP declined by O.Lpercent in 1990 and grew by only 0.8 percent in.1991. j,
The reasons for this poor economic performance in Latin America and in low- and •
middle-income countries elsewhere have been well studied and researched: the debt'
bverharig;'the woridwide recession iii'the early'1980s and the US recession at the'
end of the decade; a highrealrate of inte;rest; arid a continuation of domestic policies that wereriotcoiiducive to econoririic growth. With respect to the latter, the following are bfteh'listed:''
' - ' ^ y - ' ' '
i : ' ' •
''
restrictions on trade to protect (loiriestic industry slowed national (and international) economic g r o w t h ; '
- 1'
.;
investment was hurt by high real rates of interest and by overvalued exchange,,'
., : rates;
•
,. i.
.
, ', ,
•
- ' public sector enterprises proved to be an inefficient way to deliver many goods
and services;
i.:
government fiscal and tax policies led to deficits which have contributed to
inflation, and failed to provide the best playing field for investors;
meeting the needs brought on by irrimediate economic crises diverted the atterition of governments away from investment in human capital through health and
education programmes.
. :
The world economic outlook for the remainder of the 1990s, according to the projections surveyed here, is for a continued but slow recovery through 1992, for worid
trade to increase and for economic growth to return (by the mid-1990s) to approximately its long-term path of about three percent per year. However, the variation in
this growth rate among nations may be greater than in the past. Those countries with j,
richer endowments of natural and human resources, and those with economic policies more compatible with growth, will do better. Indeed, there are reasons to be
optimistic about the 1990s,-ThejInter-American Development Bank (IDB) labels
the 1990s a decade of hope and points to the turnaround in domestic policy in Latin
America at the end of the 1980s: "...reevaluatiori of past policies led to the adoption'
of a series of fundamental reforms aimed at correcting some of the existing macroe- '
conomic disequilibria as well as sortie of the distortions in the countries' products
and factor markets, in order to establish a more solid foundation for future growth."^
While itis too early to tell whether policy reform 1 has gone.far enough in Latin. .
American countries, it is clear that the world market in|Which they will compete is-:
likely to be very different from that of the 1980s.
This paper is about the prospects for the world economy in the 1990s and the fiscal
choices that this environment implies. In the next section a number of projections
are reviewed and compared with the actual economic performance of the past
decade. Then we tum to a review of the broad trends and structural changes that will
affect the competitive position and policy stance of low-income couritries] and to'
the.major uncertainties that may alter these trends. The final section of the paper
outHnes some of th^^
;•;
© 1992 International.Bureau of Fiscal. Documentation
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A. Will the government sector
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' i
-1 ;,
•
•
B. How will personal income be
.
taxed?
;
C. Should the tax system be
j
•
structured to encourage
investment?
•
D. Will government be centralized
^ or decentralized?
Conclusions

, ; ) - ; .

1../ For.good discussions of the problems, "see
Tanzi and Chu (1989); and Blejer and'Cheasty
(1990).
2.
See IDB (1991), at 1.
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II. PAST AND PROJECTED ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE

j y • T The real price of oil will not rise measurably, at least not
until the second half of the decade. Petroleum prices will
• d^^
strength of the recovery of the industrial
The weak performance of low-income countries in the past!< •
- -^^^^^
the most optimistic forecasts, indusdecade, and of Latin American countriesin^particular,'is •! •"'' '^^'trial growth wili'not be strong until the second half of the
described in Table 1, There was little increasein per capita • - • decade.
:
—
GNP in either group over the 1980-89 period;tand!the stan• The recession in indusriial countries will end, but an
dard of living in many developing countries did not grow.^
"average" forecast','is ,that .G-7 countries will grow
Meanwhile, the growth among (high-income) O E C D counmarkedly slowerjhain in the past decade (World Bank
tries was robust enough that per^ capita GNP nearly doubled
;,:[1992],:p. 7). Full recovery to higher levels of growth
over this saiiie'period, and the gap betweeti rich and poor
—
will not take place until the late 1990s;
—
countries widened considerably.
•
The United States will resolve its fiscal deficit problem.'
This assumptionis probably overly optimistic since the
..
TABLE 1
'
USdeficit has risen in absolute temis this year, aiid; the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings target of a balanced budget in
E c o n o m i c P e r f o r m a n c e in t h e 1980$:
1993 will not be achieved; The Congressional Budget
S e l e c t e d R e g i o n s a n d Indicators
Office (1991) estimated that the budget deficit will fall
under present policies, but will not reach balance ;until
1980

Per Capita Real GNP
(in 1987 US dollars)
Latin A m e r i c a ' ' '
Low Income
O E C D High Income

1989

1920
310
10650

1950
330
19240

24.3
25.5
22.0

19.5
28.4

Investment as a
' ' '
Percent of G D P
Latin Anie'rica
Low-Income
O E C D High-Income

Change

-'•'$30 ( 1 . 5 % )
'
$20 ( 6 . 5 % )
$8590 (80.7%)

- 4 . 8 % of GDP
2 . 9 % of GDP
• - 0 . 2 % of G D P ;

2r.8,

1;-nnclu'ding the Caribbean
'
Source: IVorWraWes 7997, Tables l a n d 15.'

'
*

i

'

'

>!• .
j '

t

What of the 1990s? The results of several forecasts, based on
econometric models, are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 (as,
reported in World Bank [1991a]). Some projections give both
a "baseline" and a "pessimistic".forecast, based on a set of
upside arid downside assumptions. Shorter-term projections,
prepared by the IMF, are shown in Table 4. > •
rr./•]••:.

<

.

.

Industrialized countries

'

. If

»• • >' •'• "

For; high-income industrialized nations the baseline projections for real GNP. growth range from 2.8 to 3.2 percent per
year. In other words, the models predict a growth no greater,
ori average,' than the 3.1 percent that took place in the 1970s
and 1980s. In Tact,-the average'of these projections would
have a slower growth rate than that of the last 20 years. All of
the baseline forecasts- however, callfor a substantial rebouri'd'
from the dismal economic performance of the past few years.'
The structure of this grpwthis expected to differ, from that of,
the past decade. Four of the six forecasts see a lower rate of
inflation, and all project a lower real rate of interest and an
increased volume of exports:
;
. ^
Though the assumptionsin.these forecasts ivary.from model
to model, the World Bank^ baseline assumptions are.perhaps;
representative., They-assume {(World Bank [1991a], :p.:27))
that:.-

i:.,

n'J

i

I ; . . . ; ! ';:Jvti';.:nf

• - Economic -growth in Europe- and- Japan, will -remain
]f > : 5 strong as policy reforms lead to increases in productivity.
An average forecast for the 1991-95 period is for Japan to'
' ' g r o w at about 3.8 'peircent'per year, coriipared to four per. cent in, the i980s.; It is assumed; that;Japari's:export
growth will not be as robust as in the past, and the real
^ rate of irivestriient will belower.'Germany; by this same'
. I ; averaging, is expected to grow at 2.8 perceht,,well^a^^
its two percent growth in the previous decade. (World
Bank [1992a], p. 7).
_ ^,
,
, ,.
• , Net flows of capital to developing countries vyill gradual. .' ly expeuid. It is assumed that economic policies in devel'''.bpirig countries will strengthen the competitive position
' 'of these countries in attracting capital, and that their cfed-,
itworthiness will be restored.
'
'
-'
• ' Real interest rates will not fall to as low a level as was
-'-achieved during most of the 1960s and 1970s, but will be:
^' well below those of the 1980-89 period}!;!* > . y . : • / . . : ;
• 'The GATT talks'will be successful, except in agriculture:
The World Bank also, produces a pessirnistic forecast, made,
by,altering the above assumptions. In this scenario the price,
of oil is higher, the GATT taUcs are unsuccessful i all areas',
and pyerall world.trade is slower, and both the,United,States,
and Japan experience economic difficulties. By the lowest of;
the four forecasts reported, the,G-7 countries grow by 2:.3
percent per year between 1991 and 1995. This compares with
an actual growth of 2.8 percent in the^i980s.^''
According to the Bank model, the downside scenario (compared with the baseline forecast) will lead to a higher rate of
general inflation, a substantially higher real rate of interest, a
reduction'in the volume of world trade and a reduced flow of
capital to low-income countries.
"
- •'
3. ;., The ^yo^idj Baiik"!([1996], at; 39) reports that there jwas ^consideriabieprogress in reducing'poverty in the 1960s and 1970s, biit'that the picture for the
1980s is mixed.' "In some regions the poor'have suffered' serious setbacks,'
whereas in others the progress of previous decades hascbntiriuedand has even;
accelerated."'.;,. ,
^ ,,)
r
,.. ;,. ,.„;,
.,: . l , , , ,
|
4.
The four forecasts are Data Resources Incbrpprated, National Institute of
Economic and Social Research, The Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associ-'
ation Group and Consensus Economics Incorporated (World Bank [1992a]).!- /
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TABLE 2

I'

i n ( T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l E c o n o m i c C l i m a t e in t h e 1990s:
ij j . A C o m p a r i s o n o f R e c e n t anci P r o j e c t e d Indicators*
", ' ( a v e r a g e a n n u a l ' p e r c e n t a g e c h a n g e / u n l e s s noted). •
,.• J O : - t i t . 1 * - . ' O i \ ^ U . i i
• •
•- '

vhn ."\

.'In:.,.

DECEMBER-1992

1

1

..{, J

Projectionsfor the 1990s •
Recent
'experience"

''
Indicator •

Trend
1965-89

World Banl<
•
.'baseline,
•1980-89';! 1 9 9 0 . . ' 1 1 9 9 0 - 2 0 0 0

World B a n k r v - . , o liVlF,.-.->,ji.,.: : Project,-.,,. ,i;WEFA
,t,iiiiv,'P!
downside,., ,,• baseline,)
UNK, .,.,t, , i G r o u p , ,
.•.DRI,,.,
1990-2000
,1991-96
', '1991-95
1991-95^1991-95
.11.

High-income.-!, ( . . , : , ,
,,,
[!),/
'su\,-> ' i
O E C D members'
Real GDP
'3.1
' ' *.3.l'
2l6"^«'"
Inflation^"
" 6 6'
' ' 38
3 7
Interest rate (%)'
'
- ^
J ! '! . 1 ' m;''!
Nominal"
8 6 ' . ' 10 2
8 4,
. a.
, 4 3 ,|,.r>,
Real"
,
3.1
5

29'

2.2

••3:6'

4.3,,

'7 A i

9.6

World trade^

, 5 0

1 5.8'-'

4T5"'

22.2

-0.6'

0.9

Real pnce of oil'

'41

41

_ 9.3

-10.1

34

3.1

, 3.4

.

2.8...-,-

' 3:4""

.Hi'
3.2
4.4

3.1

3:3
7.9^
4.9^

•.•r-:;oibn

5.r

r

"

4.3
...'—3.0,.

0.9

- ...0.8

—2.0

a'.. •'GDP deflators In local currency for World Bank and'iMF projections; for others; inflation is measured by consumption price deflator,,, \.-yr, .;;;q, 3 y ,
b. ],Six-month LIBOR on dollar depc^its,'? a:i'^::.i;or<ifu c.-;ia'>VL ! ^ \ . ' ^
• .
P'J v ? ^ ' V,^
c. .. US three-montin,Treasury bill rate;.the,real rate is tfie,Treasury.bill rate deflated by the US GNP deflator; DRI projections are for the USiorig-term"goy-j"
eVhment bond yield'.deflated by the'US GNP deflator.''^
•i' .
.'c.
VM
•.•irij:,,'>iv,..?.;
d. ' ' LIBOR deflated by US inflation rate (perc'entage'charige'in'theGNP deflator).
e.':'World volume of exports.!
.'>(;do'i fs. sff Son l i i - / f!)-.v*;-r_; •
f. ,.; Average OPEC price of oil deflated by the manufacteres unit value exported by industrial countries; Project LINK is the average price for Saudi Arabian,,
" exports deflated by the GNP'deflator..",".^ "
-%"''•'.'.'"','•
Sources: World Bank data;'IMF 1991; WEFA'Groupi99'lVDRI/McGraw-Hill 1990; Project LINK 1991; as reported In World Development Report 1991: . ' l '
i)''.!)^''; • . o h i ' v - 1 , i < : ; i - v - ' j
,ri;\-.'ai;i .Kiooioq. t ; .
' . : '^\.y - .
•
, •....-.:'....!,:,.•
T T „ : . _ j Nations
X T „ » : —
/ i n n m projections'
— j 7 „ _ . „ fpr
u „the"
:
„
•
j
The United
(1990)
industrialized
coiintries arid. the .world economy gerierally.* agre^^
the
results' presented aboye.'^'lliey pr^^
real per capita GDP
growth rate of 2^6 percem
that is significantly beiow the long-tenritren^

The medium-term' outlook;as: seen by. the IMF ;(1992) is
somewhat more optimistic (Table 4).fFori;1992-andil993,
they see a significantiincrease:in real GDP growth, reaching
3.3ipercent by; 1993. This is,higher than most of the. long-,
term projections summarized in Tables 2 and 3, tiiough it is
lower than the Fiirid's even riiore bptiriiistic'view iri' 1991
(IMF [1992]- Chapter •lV'The;a993^results are driven by
assumptions of lower interest rates'and'a lo\yef general fate'
of inflation, and by the projection of a significant increase in'
the volume of world trade by 1993.
' '
• " ;

B. Developing economies^

;i.

plagucd by the Same problems as in the 1980s: high realirates
of interest, low commodity prices and the resource dram associated with the debt overhang. The performance of the.yyorld
economy has two conflicting effects on Latin American countries. The slower growth in the industrial economies in the
early 1990s will dampen export markets and therefore retard
grovvth in 'exports by'aHlow-incoin^ cbuntnes, and it'will
slqvv, the flow of capital from theindushialized to'the de^
oping countries: On the other hand, the lower real rate of inter^
est will provide sonie relief to heavily mdebted couritries. '
Under the World Bank's pessimistic scenario, the projected;
growth for all developing economies is 0.8 percent per year
slower, and for Latin America is 0.5,percent slower (than the
baseline forecast). In effect, it would be a continuation of the
1980s. Oil importers fare 'particularly badly in this scenario,'
because of the assumption'bf a higher price for oili^^

^

The United Nations (1990) projects.that all developing counT;
tries will experience a per capita GDP, growth of two percent
'The long-term projections for, developing and middle^income
between 1990 and'2000, but that countries in Latin Americat
economies^ as repohedjbj^ the,'^orld Bank,' are'reproduced
i Md the Caribbean,will.grow at half this,rate.j.'ITiis projected,
'Tjable 3.'According to the .World Bank baseline ^scenario, it^ is /'
poor performance for Latin America and the Caribbean would,
expected that the average •gro;wth! in per. capita, real GDI^; in]
be,well below'the historical levels of growth in per capita
(ieveloping countries will exceed that of the. 1980s, but there
GDP of 2.4 percent in the 1970s and 2.7 pefceht in the 1960sare wide variations around this mean. Some countries', arii
even some regions,' will not fare .well: Low-; and middleThe'IMF mediiim-teriri projections'fordeyelopirig'couritries•
income countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Latiri Anieri-;
in the'Westerii.Heniisphefe are for a,mi6^dest'grbvv
ca are expected to grow at less than the intemational average,'
GDP and per capita real GDP in 1992, biitifor a significant
rate. For the Latin American countries, the realpercapita' increase in both in 1993 (Table 4).'The large increase in 1993
GNP growth rate is projected to be less than the average ^fate
is associated with continued liberalization of economic poll-'
realized over the past 25 years. The reasbri for this expected
cy, a significantly lower fate of inflation and a'dramatically"
weak performance in many countries is that they remain.
improved fiscal balance (IMF [1992], Chapter 3).
i
© 1992 International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
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TABLE 3

R e a l G D R a n d r e a L G D R p e r c a p i t a groyvth r a t e s for l o w - a n d m i d d l e - i n c o m e e c o n o m i e s , 1 9 6 5 - 2 0 0 0
'..
: (annual percentage change, unless n o t e d ) ,
,
'
.Real GDP growth

Region or group,

GDP, 1 9 8 9
(billions o f ,
dollars

Real GDP per capita growth;

Projection for 1990s
! Trend,
,1965-89

Baseline

Projection for 1990s
Trend,
1965-89;

• Downside " : .
:

All low-.and middle-,
, income economies ,,

•3,303

Region i
<
.
•
Sub-SaharanAfrica
Excluding Nigena
Asia
, .
,
' East Asia
''
- South Asia
•
" •'
Europe, Middle East;
and North Afnca
Latin A m e n c a and the
'Canbbean

171
. -142
... " ,.

,

4,053

,

480
.367,

, ,

.

. ..

4.7
3.2
-3.3

49

•

'

- 4.1

Baseline' ' ' D o w n s i d e ' '
't it

0
•2.5

29

iJ

22

3.6
36

35
3 1

04
'04 '

05
04

67
47

,5 6

52
1.8

53
2.6

42.
2.1

3.6

3.2

1 . 8 '

1'4

-

:>

03
00
•Mr,;;

-895'
351

'

1,552
1,131
.1

828

7.2
4.2

'

, ,

42

433

964

i

1 ' J

' 4.2

22

........

Income Group '
' Low-incorne ' "
economies
i Middle-incomev
-

Population,:
• 1989
(millions),

^

421

43

1

1

i

38

1 8

,,.,20

^ ,

1 3

. 1 , 1 /
T.[

996

economies

2,948 '

2,308

.

1,105.;

,

5.1

5 5

•4.5

'4 5

4.8
'

3.7

.

• ,
'

•

,

... J • • ;

2.9

2.9
25

. 2 . 6 ' • • ' 1.9

,

"

Source: World Bank data, as reported in World Development Report 1991.

• TABLE 4
Indicators of E c o n o m i c G r o w t h : ' •
Actual and Projected A m o u n t s ' '
i

1990

1992r

1991

1993
Iff

Real G D P , ,
All Developing Countries
. Western Hemisphere
' DevelopingCountries

-•>'•'

.
••

Industrial Countnes
Real per Capita G D P >'
All Developing Countries'" •!•' •

'3.3

67

' 5.4

-0 1

28

2.7

4.2

. 2 5 ^
0^ )t

08

1.2

;•

1.8'

3.3''
t

'•1.3

-1.6

i]

.'2 5
• T ' '"• •

' W e s t e r n Hemisphere'-" •:
• Developing Countries ' '
Industrial Countnes

3.5

-2.1
••

1.8

08

0.6

02

• 1.1

mance, of the .world economy. However, the way in.which
investment capital lis distributed among nations is partly a
result of how govemment policy in developing countries faces
up to the problem of imbalances in financial resource flows,
i.e. the resource claims of'debt repayiheht;and domestic government expenditures on one side of the fiscal equation^ versus the supply of resources available'from taxes and extemal
assistance oh the other. The third major issue is the worldwide
effects of trade and income growth of the new trade alliances
in Europe and North America; and of the new'ecoiioinic order
in'Eastem Europe and the former Soviet Union.^*'* ' " ^ ? '

' 2 1
2'7

a''Annual grovrth rates '
'
t •
,»
'
b."Exduding Eastern Europe and the former USSR -',;
Source: World Economic Outlook 1992, vanous tables.

III. FACTORS SHAPING THE WORLD OUTLOOK
Some major, issues;.lie underneath these, long, views of i the
growth of the world econorriy, and of the share of that growth
which vvill belong .to the developing countries, llie first is the
extent to, which the process of global econoinic integration
will continue;;"The.second is the adequacy;of,the. supply ,of
iiiyesttnent capital ,for deyeloping; countries. ,This i poteiitial
constraint to development is partly beyond the control of lowmcome countries, i.e. it is more a consequence.of the perfor-

A. Global integration

'i

ii

For the developing couritries, the cornerstones of economic
policy are to find markets for exports; to find sources of capital for industrial and infrastructure''developrhent,'''arid;
increasingly,, to :develop, competitive, production .technologies. The, 1^^^^^
of economicintegration, as countries liberalized
and adopted]macroecqnomic policies that were more,conducive to fpreign^and domestic jinvestmen^^ |The,outlook for
the ;world economy in 'thei99ps is much stronger if this trend
continues.; The, J M F ,(199^
argument in a studyioffl-l developing countries for the 1983-,
1989 period.,Theyfihd that pqtentia^^
cent per year in those cqiintries with an "outward" trade ori5.;, A longer, treatise on the.worid economy would consider several of the big
uncertainties that make ^forecast's in this fdecadeesp^^
difficult: political
instability and war; the'further .'development and transfer of te'chriblogy," the
prospects for changes in energy prices and the environment.

© , 1 9 9 2 International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
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entation and by 2.2 percent per year in those with atf- -Three key areas will define the progress of global economic
"inward" trade orientation. However, Roemer and Radelet
integration in the next decade. Labour mobility, capital mobil" ity and trade'are the principal'ways in which modem tech([1991], pp. 64-65)Teview"a cbiitfary literatufe^^^
that the now-conventional prescription of outward-lbokihg" ' 'riiqiies of production and communication are spread, and the
means by which comparative advantages are discovered and
policies is based more on economic principles than on empiricaljevidence^'::L2ECi::;L'?''':'_.
_.
, i!^"'^^-^:!:!.'^ i'become part of a country's economic strategy.Tncreased international labour mobility could lead to substantial gains for the
There isi'in fact, global evidence that a sorting butprocess is
, worid economy/iarid for most countries involved in either the
leading nationsfo^find theif.cpmparative advmitages (^Yqrld
'^^'^import or export''of labour.-Erriigration to ' labour-short
Bank [1992a]).jrotal_world trade has increased.In the.manu-,
"economies may relieve labour surplus economies of the presfacturing sector, trade increased at an average rate of 4.9 persures of a high unemployment pool, and therefore rriay lead to
cent while output increased at:a rate of 3.9 percent. The share
an'overall improvement in the'distributiori oif iricoriie^The
of technology-intensive manufacturing has increased in the
main drawbacks are the problems of "brain drain" in some of
industrialized countries, while the share ofrlabour-intensive
the low-income economies, and the resistance by'host cbiiritry
manufacturing exports in developing countries has risen.
workers to beingcrowded out by rriigrant workers. There also
Within manufacturing, there are many country-specific
is the advantage^ that movements of skilled labour, are Ian
examples of specialization as firms have sought out cheap
important way to diffuse technology, and foreign labour has in
labour'and taken'advantage of lower transportation costs and
many cases been invaluable to labour-short economies, j u ? :
newer communications technologies.
^
^
Capital mobility, especially in the form of, direct foreign
On the other hand, this specialization may not have gone so far
investment, is another important source of technology transfer
as the rhetoric. The difference between the' growth in trade in
that can stimulate economic growth and trade bet^yeeIl counmanufacturing and the growth in output is narrower now than
riries.Case sriidies of Hong Kong and Mexico have shown that
it was a decade ago. Even the penetration of industrial country
the presence of foreign firms has increased the diffusion of
markets by L D C manufactured goods is riot so widespread.
technology and improved the efficiency of local firms (World
The .World Bank (1992a, p. 31) reports that the developing
Bank [1991a], p. 94). The experience of foreign firms in mancountry share of industrial country imports of labourriritensiye j
agement and marketing techniques can" benefit local fintis
manufactured goods ahnost doubled between 1965 and 1989,,
who are trying to gain a foothold in world markets. Moreover,
rising from 9.8 to 18.8 percent. However, this increase is due
the volume of trade with a country may be substantially
entirely to East Asia, whose,share increased from 1.4 to 12.4
increased by direct foreign irivestrrient simply because of the
percent over this same period. "This mearis that the sftaVe of all
trade channels that are^ opened •with affiliates.^ recent study
other developing nations'actiially declined during this period.
reports that' in ;the^early, i98()srintrafinn trade within the
The volume of trade, however, has increased substantially.'
largest 350 transnational corporations. (TNCs) contributed
about 40 percent of global trade.* One need only imagine the
The impetus for global. integration. comes i from several facT
opportunities for transfer pricing, tax'evasion arid tax aybidtors. .The cost of transportation and communications has fallance to speculate on how daunting is the task of administeririg
en; reducing the "distance"; constraint to increased trade.iThe
a tax system that does not have an export brieritatiori'.
gap between' the rich and the poor nations; in; the growth of
income: and the. relative inflation;of currency values,has
Trade liberalization is perhaps the most important question
enhanced the labour cost advantage of low,-income countriesmark in assessing the outlook for the world,economy in the
The price of primary,commodities has been;low sfor.some
1990s. It is clear that developing countries iriust gain access
time in world markets. Finally, changes in production proto the markets for manufactured goods] in industrialized
cesses and strategies, such as the increasing variety of prodcountries. L D C s in aggregate sell less than five percent of
uct lines'and product quality, require'a closer working relatheir manufacturing output to other developing countries, and
tionship betvveen importers; and exporters.;,,"This, enhances
more than four fifths of the world market is in industrialized
economic integration,and development of, the, trade sector in
countries. On the other hand, developing and industrialized
d^elopirig^econpriiies.^^
'i.',, . ''i'Ju-irri'v:^! " i J
couritries alike have erected restraints to trade. The trade barTo growing (biit riof yet industrialized) couritries;'global interiers in industrialized countries have not been significantly
gration means'gainirig•jobs^govei^lrnentTevenue•and access
relaxed in the 1980s, with a few exceptions. Most observers
to foreign exchangeyBiitit also mean's gaining the techn'olo'-'
seem to agree that developing cbuntiy exports to industrialgy necessary to sustain''a higher'rate of productivity and
ized countries could increase, even in the presence of the
growth in the * long riin.- Productivity - increases will lead trade restraints that are in place (World Bank [1992a]). A sucdeveloprrient in • the •riiore• competitive and'more technically cessful G A I T round, however, could lead to substantial gains
corfiplex' world economy; of the 1990sJ The Wprld 'Bank
for low-iricbrrie countries. One estimate'is that a five-percerit(1991a, p. 88) notes that "...growth' in productivity,' the'best
age-point reductiori in manufacturing tariffs by industrialized
proxy for technological change, has accounted for as miich as
counties 'would lead to a'real GNP gain of L6'percent per
30 percent of GDP growth in-the'East Asian countries". A
year in low-iricome'debtbr countries,- and 1.4 percent per year
major issue of development policy, therefore, will be techfor couritries in the Western Hemisphere (IMF [1990], pp.'
nology transfer. Removing barriers to the sharing of technol74-75). However, if the GATT negotiations fail, industrial-'
ogy should be high on: the list- of priprifie^^^ for. stimulating
development. . : : , : ; i , v , . (.., i i ; !,;.;•,",:;.:. , > - : , : , i - j i ; ( ;
.v-r. j
6: =SeeWorldBankX1992a),'at33.:
•:• • :\ ^r.;
o
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ized countries'could move toward a new series of bilateral
arrangements and developing countries could see their potential markets shrink.
:.7, ;
:( JGlobal integration could slow in the 1990s'.,TCe'GATT agreenaents are the major issueof uncertainty. The slow^^^^
in the industrial economies in the'early 1990s almost cehamly means that, compared to the 1980s, export markets will not
be as robust and the flow of investment capital to the rest of
the world will not be so greatl The decline in transportation
costs seems to be approaching a bottoming-out, hence that
stimulus \yill not be as strong (Worid Bank [1991a]). Finally,
there is,the issue of whether the LDCs,will stay their,policy
course of the late 1980s and continue to adopt investor- and
trade-friendly policies, r :
. ;
. .

B. Development finance

•-

'

The projections reviewed above, assume that the substantial
capital .resource constraint facing the, deyeloping countries
can be, relaxed.:The,three candidate sources of capital are
direct foreign investment, return of flight capital and foreign
assistance..t-q,,^'-cs;-;',,'::i): ,i •
During the last half of the 1980s the level' of direct' foreign
investment increased from $ 47 to $ 132 billioh,'at a faster rate
than total world investment. This suggests a growing worid
econoinic integration. Ho\yever, the share of direct foreign
investment going to the deyeloping countries fell from 24 percent to 13 percent oyer this same period. Two thirds of this
amount wentto East Asia arid Latin America, and in the latter
case, primariiy,;to,Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and', Colombia
(Finance and Development .[1992]). If the developing
economies are to, capture a greater share of foreign,direct
investment, they .will have to continue the economic liberalization policies which began in the late 1980s. The IDB sees
this as possible arid expects that; the attractive rate of return on
foreign investment in Latin'America willresvilt in ah iricrease
in the volume of foreign direct investment by a factor of about
2.5 before.the end of the century, (IDB [1991], pp.'18-19).
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of developing nations to attract investment capital will depend
on whether they can sustain policies:that will restore confidence intheir economies (Goldstein, etal. [1991],'pp. 1-44).
Greene and Villanueva (1991) found evidence that the rate of
total private investment in-developing countries is positively
related to the rate of real GDP growth, the level of per capita
GDP and the rate of government irivestmeht^^
that: the' ihvestrneiit' fate is negatively 'related to real interest
rates,' and tlie levels; of'inflatioii and debt. Latin 'American
coiintries '.have' libefalized trade ]to';a sighificaht extent' in
recent years.;'Afgeritina;'' Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,' Costa
Rica, Ecuadof, Honduras,' Mexico; Pern and Venezuela have
eliminated qiiantitative restrictions and lowered tariff levels.
Ih sorrie cases the refonris have beeii broad-based and have
included.reduction of the fiscai,deficit, a cap on borrow^ing
Md significant privatization
,, ,
',
Finally,'there are the traditional'sources of direct extemal
assistance'in' the form of loans. These are' expected to be
modest for the Latin American region, declining from $ 9 billion in 1993 to about $ 4 billion at the end of the century (IDB
[1991], p. 19). The result will-be a very modest increase in
total debt outstanding over the next ten years. Much of the
borrowing requirements'for Latiri 'Ariierica will be filled-by
the Worid Bank, the IMF and the IDB;
':: ' ti-^
Will thet sources ^ of direct .foreign linvestment and> official
loans be sufficient to meet the financing needs of developing
countries in the next decade? There :are two reasons to be
cautious in the forecast of what might be expected: One is the
slower, growth in the industrial economies in the first half of
the 1990s. And since the US deficit problem does not appear
close to resolution, the level of savings may, be less than has
been assumed in these forecastslThe other is the competition
for funds from (a) the newly emerging economies in Eastem
Europe, and (b) the countries of the European Community
(EC) as they adjust to their new economic roles.
, . ,.
-

C. A/ew markets arid new economic power

'' *' • • •' •

The performance of the, world ^economy oyer the next ^^t^
The second source of extemal financing is th'efetuiri of flight
years will be shaped by two other important factors:,the percapital. The IDB (1991, p;119) estimates the: total amount to
formance, of the transition economies and the policy direcbe about $ 170 billion, equivalent to about one third of the
tions.takenbythe new trading blocs... , r,
; .
•.:
region's total extemal debt. The Worid Bank (1991a, pp.a2425); estunated:that,; during the: 1980-84 • period,;the; amount
1. The transition economies,
• .!''
was as high as $ 40 billion for Mexico and, $27, billion for
Venezuela. The IDB points out the potential pf this source of
Before the 1990s end, the transition economies (Eastem
finance with the followirig conjecture: if investors decided to
Eiirope and China)"may substantially impact the,share of
hold constant the real value of their'assets abroad, and bring
worid economic growth gained by the developing countries
home only the rnmualretiirn, there would be a re-entry'of
by (a) providing new. export markets, (b) providing,a new
about $ 10 bilhon by the'end of the' ceiitufy^(IDB' [ 1991]; pJ
competitor for exports to the industrialized countries, and/or
19). This is equwalent tp'a^^^ half tlie expected'flow of
(c) siphoning off some of the extemarcapitaiflo\ys that otherdirect foreign investment.''
' ''-'^^=:
s•
"'
wise might have found their way,to the deyeloping countries.
•.',ir;;,:i; -tii; ,,.y-, :/.•])!) •- yiC'•':y--")
^ :;i:i,!lii!a ,^i•>i
The, determinants of,capital;flight and the determinants of
How quickly might the new competition fof the world export
investment capital inflows,are much the same. Capital flight
market occur? The answer will vary from country to country.
occurs because domestic macroeconomic poHcies (or political
The breakup of the Soviet Union and its'economic influence
instability) cause investors to lose confidence in the. economy,
zoneis still in ^ process: The economic libefalizatipn process
and seek alternative locations for their investments. They seek
that is now underway in much of Eastern'Europe and in the
out locations which give them some combination of safety on
fornier Soviet-Union Republics'wilLbe painful, and now it
their principal and a higher after-tax rate of return. The, ability
appears that the transition willriot be short-lived. There like© 1 9 9 2 International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
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ly will be ainet transfer.of resources to these countries from
the rest of the world through. the mid-1990s. However, both
the IMF. (1992); and:;the^United';Nations (i990),:projectva
stronger growth in Eastem Eiirppe and the former USSR than
inmostoftherestof the;Wforld;;h a:
uiio'ni r r,c; I;.';:;
Some ^Eastem -European countries,^howeyer,.may, be able.to
rripve more qu'ic^^
pern market. Czechosloyajaa, Hungary, aiid Poland, for exantj
ple^ have recently, signed an agreeinenUhat provides for. a
trade area.with the E C . Quantitative restrictions have been
removed,in all three countries, and tariffs are being lowered.
China is a different story. The adjiistnient process has beeriHeij
ther so'swift no'f sppainful;'arid real output increased by about
seven percent last year. The state enterprises have been brought
under semi-autonomous'manag'emerit, given'some
in operating decisions, and switched from;a remittance to'a tax
regime. AH of4his has. occurred, inless than a:.decade,,>The
speed MrithiWhichtheChinese. economy develops.and shifts.to
an export orientation is another major question,"mark underneath these long-term forecasts.;The.UnitediNations projects
the Chinese; economy, tO/growjatr'atreat .rate] of 5.6' percent
between 1990: and 2000. This, is well above the world growth
rate, but below that experiencedin China in the; 1986s. >
\
The other concem aboiit the competitiohfrom the transition
economies isthat they will attract foreign capital that otherwise may have been'destined, for less developed countries;
The WoridiBank (1992a-pp. 7-8) argues that this is not tme
m the'case of non-concessional loans,' though creditworthiness will be sciutinized more closely in the case of all potential borrowers; In the case of concessional loans,' however,
this i concem about competition will • be valid unless donors
increase their aid budgets. '
•
,

2. The new trading blocs'

'

'

'

' *

''

The performance of the new trading blocs is another important factor that can affect the long-term economic outlook for
developing cbuhtrie'si The'tvvoniajor changes to ^^c^^
here aire • the'EG and the' North American Trade'Agreement;
One view is that the preferences given to'countries within'the
blocs will reduce the size of markets for exports from less
developed countries (or for that matter, from any country outside the trading blocs). It is piossiblethat«increased intraregional;trade,pronioted^jby„the agreement will be accomplished at the, expense, of what otherwise might have ,beeri
increaised international trade. One is the (linlik'ely) policy of a
"trade fortress" stance by one of the blocs.^Another is the
possible diversion of scarce skills from mlihinational. to
regional trade negotiations.''
..
. .'
The other view is that the 1992 E C initiative will lead to specialization.in production;and efficiency gainSjthat will result
in, an oyerall; econornic growth and therefore an. increased
demand for imports that will offset any negative effects. Most
students of this debate seem, to bejin this, latter • camp, and
argue the further adyantages that: :.j
; ';
,</,;..
; T ,;
Countries within the trading bloc are pressured to reform
• :;their macroeconomic policies.- f; i:
- ; ; . i^, i;:-,'! •;
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Progress on multilateral trade negotiations.;may be
enhanced because the number of parties;in the negotia^
tions is fewer.
;:
, ; ; • • : ; :,
Export entry is easier because the mles for trading with a
, single bloc o f countries'are easier to team than are the
mles arid institutions for a number of individual countries.
AJ

'u

'

1,1

' I

'

A

f '

IV. FISCAL CHOICES FOR THE 1990S
i(i

ii

1

IJ / I

'

\j

I

'
,

Mostanalysts of the Latin American-economic crisisof-the
1980s are in ag'rieeriient tliat domestic policy chariges niust be
enacted'and sustained if econoriiic growth is to'be'restored;
Theiast decade savi' an interventionist' iapprbach in-many,
countries, whereby domestic industry:-was'protected from
foreign competition in some cases and stifled by public enterprises in others, exchange rates ,were,overvalued,;and govemments were in deficit and borrowed heavily. The next
(lecade must see more of a laissez-faire approach to economic 'management -and an opening of the Latin'econorriiesito
take''aidvantage of a changing'intem'atibri'al economy.' The
immediate objectives of this policy are to increase the fate of
economic growth by increasing export volume, attracting
external, investment capital, o increasing the efficiency , of
Jdomestic'industfy and providing adequate public services in
an envirorimerit of stable prices. ... :
,, , ,
,
The principles that lie behind the formulation of such domestic policies'niay be summarized as follows:
•
' '
The best approach to attracting foreign investment and
' re-attracting flight capital is a stable macroeconomic per' ' forriiance., Low and steady rates of inflation, small
' ''deficits on the'govemmerit and trade accounts, and a'sta-'
''; 'ble'exchange rate will do'riiore to",attfac't and ret'airi'ecb•ribmicacti'vity than wilf even the riiost attractive package
;•';''' of targeted iricehtives.':'';;'!-•':'
••••^'y • •; i;:-:,,.-.;
- * 'The'governriient!'should;.riot ,t^^^ an' interventionist
' approach' except; where 'tip' presence' of important' exter-:
nalities; demands it! ,Ta'x, trade' 'arid industrial policies
shbiild be coordiriated and 'should' interfere as little as
;,: possible with the market, i : . ; : ; ; : , ' ; -vi:; •: a •
i-Vl
- ! ;.The rate of investment in health and education should be
increased.:;:
...•;•;.;:.-!;.';„ ,r;:J';.^ — .,
; c ,
Borrowing should be limited byithe growth m taxable
;f;i' capacity, the present level of debt burden and the intrinsic value of projects.:;.;.!;: ill tt;,:
; ; ; ; , ; , ; . : i,^ •
In fact, the 19808 did see a major tumarbiind in miacroecbribrriic pbiicy in the Latin American region. The elimination
of quantitative festrictibris ^ d the reductibri iri tariff fates in
riianyjcburitries .reduced barriers ib trade, and the results will
be felt fiilly iri'the 1990s.'Countries Have conie to grips with
the burden bf their exterrial debt by riegotiatibn.with creditors, limiting future bortowing and riiore carefully scmtinizing the purpose of loans. Lower interest rates in the early
1990s ^will provide, further relief Substantial; progress has
also been made in the area of privatization-of public enterprises, e;g. in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. : . :

7,: i, De la Toire and Kelly (1992).
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Arguably,' the area where reform,is most necessary,:and in
some countries has been slowest; is fiscal and tax policy; This
is not to say that substantial fiscal reform has not taken place.:
Many Latin American governments have undertaken adjustments and have moved to eliminate of substantially reduce:
the size of their fiscal deficits.'And in many cases,-they have
been successful: An IMF. survey of 31 Latin American countries during the decade ending in 1991 shows that the fiscal
deficit fell in 20 countries and increased in: 11. The average
decline in the deficit for the 20 countries (between-1986-1988
and 1989-1991); was 4.7' percent of GDP, and the average
increase in the 11 countries was 1;8.percent of GDP (IMF
11992], pp. 23-25).
Even in countries where policy reform has taken place, the'
economic impacts have often been compromised'by_ ai 'weak
tax adriiiriistratibn.(Bahl and Martinez [forthcom^
challenge facing inany Latin'Aniericah cbun^^
tlieir fiscarsystemsriric^
tion, in a m'annef'consistent with'this general hiacfoecoribm
ic policy direction,'and consistent with the'constraints provided by the world economy; This will make the fiscal choices more difficult. .
:
- ...:•.)./'••-: /•
There will be a slower growth in the indiistrialized economies
in' the early 1990s;(compared to" the' average bf the 1980s),'
hence'very likely a slower growth in capital flows to developing countries'and an export hiarket that.'doesnbt expand as'
fast; This'meaiis ihore'competitibn'ambrig developing countries for extefnalinvestrnent and for export mairkefs; therefore niore of a competitive edge is needed in the fiscal policies that must be designed.
•
The remainder of, this paper outlines the most important of
the fiscal choices:
. , ) M - i> , ;
••
.
1. Should there be growth in govemment expenditures, or
• declines in taxes'and borrowing? "-•''';-' •' v;
-'
2. '- Will the faxatiori pf incorhe be driven by ecbhoniic effi-'
''ciencycoricerris or by vertical equity cbncefns? l ' "
3. ' Should tax systenis be redesigned' to stimiilate invest^'
' ment, with lower (or no) taxes on capital income? • '' '
4. Should govemment become more centralized; or should
fiscal decentralization be pushed?
'' ..f. '

A.,Will the.government sector growA'continuation of the adjustment policies of thepast few
years would not suggest a growing public sector in Latin'
American countries in the 1990s: The results of the IMF survey of 31 Latin Arhericah'coiintries showed thafthe'a'verage'^
level of govemment expenditures fell from 24.4 percent in,
1981-1985,to;20.6 percek.inJ989-199L
due to' a cbrhbin'atibn of lower debt service expefiditure.'and'
Ibwerexpehditiifes for subsidies, transfef payhierits andpiiblicemployee wage bills ( I M ^
The outlobk for Latin America is for a stronger economic per-:
formance than in recent years, but not for a robust growth that'
is above the long-term trend. The baseline projections are for
a rate of real per capita GDP growth that will approximately'
match that:which took place on average oyer the 1965-1989'
period. This implies that, if the tax share of GDP.remains con-
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stant, the govemment sector will be able to expand its real;
expenditures by about two percent per capita per'year. Thisoutlook, coupled with the possibility of a reduction in the rev-:
enue'share of GDP, implies a modest growth in expenditure!
pfogramines;;and therefore a tight contrbl'over expenditure!
practices.; By the WorldBank's pessiiriistioprojections, and.
assuming no increase in taxes or; bortowing relative to GNP,
real per capita expenditure growth coiild be as low as 1.3 pef-;
cent per year.; If this less optimistic grbwth path prevails, then
the fiscal situation is even tighter. . : i > :
';
:= -.:
One choice, therefore, is fiscal austerity. At the extreme, this,
would imply no increase in the tax share, i.e. that taxes will
grow no faster than the rate of growth in GNP. It also implies
no increase in borrowing, other than for long-lived projects
with a demonstrable payback; Even here, however, any new'
debt incurred would have to be supported within the limits of
revenue that the present tax system will generate in the future.'
The austerity:scenario poses major problems for some coun-,
tries;.in particular-those which already have high levels of
taxes relative toGNP. It leaves precious little to invest in new,
infrastracture and in health and education, which are comer-;
stones in the strategy to increase thecbmpetitiveness of low-;
and middle-income nations. It also cramps govemment initia-i
tives' to redress;inequalities:in the distribution; of income
through the improvement of public services to the poor. ;=
The other choice is to resume ah expansionary fiscal programme, by increasing theeffective average tax rate (relative
to GDP) and/or by borrowing to expand infrastmcture and to,
coyer annualdeficits. Certainly there are reasons to argueipi
favour, of a larger public .sector.: There will be more; invest-j
ment in infrastmcture and in human capital, and more scope;
for providing redistributive services; ,The costs of environ-,
mental protection, an issue whichthe world must discover in;
the 1990s, will claim a substantial amount of resources. The.
World Bank (1992b, Chapter 9). estimates the cost attwo to
three percent ofth'e GDP of developing countries by the end,
of the 1990s. Though all bf this will not be govemment sector costs; the afriounts involved are equivalent to' ten percent
of niore of the budgets of most developing countries;
.'t''
.h:'ysiiy t;:^ •;;:';h;.,0':a'r, - v - ; - ; ;.;•;„•; S.,;! '• •'.;; ou:.' --yi'mf. L
"There also are the political advantagespf higher expenditures [
which appear to, out\yeigh;:the political .disadvantages ofj
deficits, at jleast pyer the;expected tenure of elected leaders, j
The doyvnsidepf this strategy is that resources will be drainedj
from, the priya.te to, the, public, sector,: with whatever, that 5
implies,for, the overall.rate of growth;in,investment (versus,
consumption) in the economy., If the, expansion is financed^
with higher taxes, then the competitive position of the cpun-.j
try may. be compromised, and the return to investors may .be;
less attractive. "Tliere may be a feeling that the business,j|cli-)
mate" is npt,right; for nevv, investment. I f the expansion.is |
financed' by,; bortowing- to. cover annual deficits,, thenrjlhe!,
economy.will be less,stable and,less,attractiye to foreign,cap-j
ital and to the retum of flight capital. Confidence,in econpm-j)
ic management will not be restored.
Are there compromises on these choices? Is it;, possible toj
spend more without raising'taxes or sacrificing important
public exp'endihife programme's? The answer is that thelfiscali
choices will be difficult if the world economy does'-not grow,)
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faster than projected,^ but there may be some amount; of relief
that will allow important expenditure programmes to be bet-;
ter covered. Expenditures ihay be reallocated to infrastriicture and human capital investment (1) if interest rates fall and;
the debt service claimson the budget:are'less,;(2) if privati-,
zation reduces the claim on govemrhent resources,' and (3) if
the financing of some govemment-provided services is shiftT;
ed;to.l beneficiaries.};There; is.isomer evidence .that
resources will materialize because of initiatives in these three
areas, but the amounts may turn put tobe modest. ;The'IMF;
(1992) projects that debt service payments as a percent of the,
total value of exports of goods and services will fall in 'West-'
em Hemisphere countries from 31.5 percent'in'1991 to 28
percent in 1997. '. . ' , ' %
.
.
.
. '
There, also- is the. question- of whetherj;any new-found
resources actually will be allocated to essential purposes; The
1990s will be a time in many countries when there will bei
pressures to subsidize prices in the aftermath of privatization,
mcre'ase jpublic employee compensation and restore lost tax*
preferences. However,'the IMF survey'of 31 Latm American'
countries (IMF [1992]','ppl72-76)'indicates that the education and health expenditure share of GDP increased in the 20
countries where the deficit was' reduced and fell ini the J11
where it was not. The results of this analysis also showed that'
the share of capital expenditures in GDPdidnotfall signifii;
cantly.in the deficit-reducing countries.
:..
, i,. .
Adjiistihents made on the tax side also can lessen the pain asso-;
ciated with hard fiscal choices.'Reductions in the average'tax'
rate for all present taxpayers'cari tie realized if a niore efficient
tax administration broadens the tax net and captures those who'
have successfully evaded or avoided payment.' There are many
opportunities to do this, because typically the tax base in lowihcbme countries is quite harrow. Perhaps the best' targets of
opportunity in this area are the self-employed under the indi-'
vidual 'income tax,;value added*tax^'exeniptibhs, import tax
exeriiptibris oi" preferential rate treatnients, arid real property;
•''.;•'f;;;fr'f;:": 'C:;' vr' :'-n -ii"'in ,;;:. :U .j-;;:'" ,y '• ' 'r!.'V
The pain of this fiscal choice.willvary from country to coun-;
try, dependingion the^ situations, from which they start.,
Jamaica, with a tax-GDP ratio nov/ approaching 30 percent,
has a'quite different situatibri from that of Guatemala^ with a
ratio of uriderteri percent; The diffefence between the situations iri these two cburitries is illustrative.'To compete effec-;
lively in the 1990s, Jamaica will have to find a way to slow
the grbwth in the public sectori It caririot afford a fiscal deficit;
with the present instability iri its ecoriomy,'arid tax iricreases;
would seem but pf the quekiori'giveii the'presenV high rate of
taxation in the economy. The' hard clibice' facuig Jam'aica' is
h'bw to cut expenditures when expenditure rieeds are so great!;
Guatemala's situatiori is better. "There is'airiple rbom for a tax'
increase to cover the experiilitufe needs of its 'pbpulatibn, aind'
the 'fiscal deficit is riot a great bne.-TTie'most'difficult choice'
in Guaferiiala is whether fb risk ari iricrease in'taxes iri'a cburi'-';
try with a Ibrigtfaditibn of resistance tb higher taxation;''' ;

B. How will personal intome be taxed?'
'i-r;;T(.;;;,;i; •••-„i'.n:-;;.!,;.' "UJ :^jXi:'; 'i<\'-i"i

•'

T;jon!iv; v K : r a

or-vq.

Most developing countriesare beset with policy and adminis-j
trative problems.in their, individual income'taxsystemsjJThe;
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revenue yield is often not up to the mark because of loopholes
that have narrowed the tax base and because of poor administration and;.widespread evasion,, especially?among the self-'
employed. A:common;reaction is for the govemment to raise
the rate r^lwhich leads to more avoidance, evasion and unde-;
sirable_allocation effects .H. and the cycle contuiues.'This pattemneither builds^confidence inthe'govemraent's ability, to
lead macroeconomic policy, nor does it contribute to a sound
revenue base to support a balanced budget; Individual income
tax stmcturesin lovv-income countries, and in Latin America,
are often ;complicated and usually have multiple objectives..
The mairi goal is revenue!generation, but many, govemment
officials and political leaders would argue that-inconieredis-j
tribution is another important objective. Accordingly, in many
coiintries,'income taxes are characterized by prbgfessiye rate
structures,/ relatively high floors arid special deductions to',
protect the popr.' Sbnie couiitries use the income tax to achieve
other, allb'cative'goals T7 everything frbrii' the stirriulatiori of
the life insurance iridustry to the ericouragement of savings to
relieve the cost bf commuting to work.
The individual income tax can play'a very important role'in
low-income countries, and it does in many countries. It can
be a major revenue raiser, it can siphon off the adniinistrative
resources of the tax departmerit, it pari impose highcompli-,
arice costs on i)ayers, it,can add pfbgressivity^^^ the overall
revenue system and it canriaye^adirect effect on the ability'to
save, irivest,;takCjrisks.arid,work harder Ariothef iriiportarit
feature o f income, taxes is that the nbriiinal tax stmcture is
very, visible to voters while the actual pattem of effectivetax
rates is not; As a result, political leaders are quite, sensitive
about making even rational changes in the nominal tax stracture'v because it might give the appearance of providing a special tax treatment to the higher income.
-''
'
One choice fof individual income taxation is simplification, a
path, that many countries in the region ;haye already taken.
This may involve adopting a flat rate, eliminating most .deductions and credits, and broadening the tax base to include all
forms of income. The advantage,of this approach is,that it
eliminates the horizontal inequities iri the system by, taxmg all
income at the same rate, and it gives no special preferences.
Because it is simple, it reduces both compliance and administrative costs. Because it is applied to a broad base, the.(nqminal) flat tax rate isTow'by comparison With hhe previous
marginal, tax Tate; therefore savings, investment,, risk taking
and yvork effort are encouraged. A more difficult issue is yvhat
to, do about capital,income taxation. Here the issue.becomes
whether coiiiitries should opt for a consumptioii;tax.,
The'fe are some disadvantages'to a brpad-bas^
r%iriie. Theriio'stimportaiit is that it is not cbnsistent with tlie
ability-t'b-pay 'cannon of justice in taxatiori. Since the sacri-,
fice'bf a dollar in taxes'is greater fof a low-incbriie thari for a!
high-income person; it is thought fair to tax the lower-income
person lat; a lower rate. Since a flat tax; does not 'do this, i f
imposes atgreater burden onthe poorer family. Theresult is'
that flat taxes are usually perceived as inequitable, and in fact^
may be iregressive in their distribution,of tax biirdens.- Other,
disadvantages! may, arise'in connection with the base-broad-:;
ening thatr accompanies the; flat tax, regime, r Because some j
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loopholes are almost certain'to remain in the system; the fairness objective will be compromised • Another problem'is that
broadening the tax base often means'bringing interest income
into the tax net, and possibly discoiiraging savings or encouraging'capital flight.: '" ••: ^ :
^ t ^ : J
:':v,r>'>i!'..: . ; \ :

F Allow repatriation of profits \vith6ut perialty.' ' o , / r, n
- - • i Reduce corporate income tax fatesl'accelerate depreciation allowances and provide a proper inflation jadjust-f
ment for inventories.
•
, , ,,
- ' ; Provide tax'incentives for.''preferred" irivestors.'
' '"''I

The Other choice is to hold to the more narrowly based,'progressive fate' structure.' It is nominally progressive and seems
to provide incentives fofsavihgs arid investmeiit.by proyiding preferential treatriient fof capital income: niariy couritries
exernptcapitalgainsarid interest incpmeraridg^
dediictions for certain types of .investnients.^Prpgfessf ye rate
stractufes are,popularVithpoliticiaris^
giye'the illusion that the rich are being tfeateddiffeferitly
under .the tax system!. .The ,biggest disadvantage is that the
narrow! base forces'a liigh mafgirial 'tax !rate!! which,iri^ tuni
discoiirage's irivestriient and work effort, !pr encourages evasion and avoidariceTThe pfogfessivity of the graidiiated fates
is often lost to the special treatment of capital income,*the
provision'of loopholes to mitigate against the high marginal
tax rates and contribute to the success of higher-income individuals in evading the tax. Bird (1992, p.:93) notes that everi
if one is not willing to go so far as the flat-rate tax,'steeply
progressive rates have no place in a well-designed income tax
in'developing countries.'-' >'• - i ; ' ' i-i;..i = r';!:!i/;Vif..
']\.' 'yai

Many of these are adjustments-that should be made in .the tax
systemriomatter what strategy is being followed (e.g. elimination of the double taxation of dividends, repatriationiwithout penalty, I zero-rating of exports). I But particularly:! the
issues. of whether special tax incentives for investors; should
be allowed, whethef> higher-income ii individuals should
receive: -a friendlief. treatment and;whether interest income
should; be free'ofJ tax, ;raise, serious questions. Proponents
argue that lower income tax fates on higher-income individuals leave theni free to save more and give them ain incentive
to invest mbre.SThese individuals have the highest riiarginal
propensity to save and are the entrepreneurs of the economy:
the ones most likely to take investment risks. Many countries
have bought Unto this afguriierit-'arid provide escapes frorii
high individual income tax rates, \yhich higher-income individuals are best equipped to use. These include tax-free intefes't'income,'riori-taxable fringeJ^benefits and the' effective
excliisiori of capital gains froniT!rie tax base. Cbriipariy tax
preferences might .iiicliide tax'', holidays and' accelerated
depreciatiori for iriceritive fitms.' (Typically, the ;VAT is not
used 'as a tnajpr part of the incentive package.) Such inceri-J
tives;are! thought to! attfact pairticulaf industries and to show
signs of a hospitable business clirnate'for foreign arid dpmestic investors! Tlie|'pfessure to adopt incentives grows with the
use of such prdgramnies by neighbouring countries! ':
'

TTie trend around the,world (arid in some Latin Ariierican and
Caribbean countries) has been in the direction of simplifica-,
tion, base-broadening and iess,rate graduation. For example,
Jamaica adopted a broad-based, flat rate (33, 1/3 pefcent)
individual income tax in 1986 (see Aim, Bahl and Murray
[1991]), and Argentina has recently proposed a 30 percent
flat-rate individual income tax, with the exemption; of dividends paid to local and foreign shareholders (Asorey [1992]).

C f Should the tax system be structuredi to encourage,
.n investment? vi^ii,

- r s r :y.[-\-y-': n

:-\ j';!.;,:,,c!q a!

The supefficial answer to this question is "yes'\ and the possible shortage of capital flow to 'developing cbuntries arid t!he
power of the new trading blocs makes it even more iriiportarit
that tax systems be export- and investor-friendly. On the face
of it there seems to be-no choice iriv'olved, butthere are end-,
less'suggestions about how orie restructures a tax systemUo
encourage -investnients. - And - there; are - major tradeoffs
involved, in that an irivestment-friendly tax system may also
be one that is less; friendly to'income distribution or to'fairness objectives; Hence the c h o i c e ; - ; l.U:-y'Z\L:':,-yl u : ;
•; i . T I

•\Ti , 'A'-, ' i . . i ; . ; i ;'

\. <

,''}'•!,:/• r - ; ; ' . „ : ' • , . ) ; ; ;

One alternative is to follp^y an interventionistpolicy andfise
tax policy to attract:investirient.;Low- and riiiddle-incdrne!
countries could adjust theif tax systems to increase,trie!after-|
tax rate of return to investors in many ways': '
- 'Reduceriiafginalindividual incoriie tax fates.
Provide special' iricoirie • tax' treatriierit of fririge beriefits
-•' feceivedbyhigher-incbriie'individuals!
''Exempt dividends frorii the individual!iricbriie tax!' ' ' ;
- , 'Exeiriptinterest!i
fronifaxatiori,'^
i'^'sis a'
''•''ideductiblecost;''''''-' '/•-'"••'
^''-^''^
<!.i:v!i-,
'
Eriact a value added tax (VAT), or increase reliance on
the VAT, and zero-rate all exports.
/. i f r ! ; . i , • !r„'!j

The disadvantages of the.interventionist appfoach are that
each of these preferences imposes a cost that must be made:
up with a higher tax rate soiriewhefe else in the system. These
higher nohiinal fates, and the distortions of econoinic
es iritrbduced'by the pfefere'nces'themselves, i^^^
inefficiency'into; the econorriy and havea real cost likely
measiired in tefms'of slower grbwth.^^^
places in
the tax system' where the lost revenue can be 'regained:
Among the possibilities are" a -higher' income Hax-rate 'for
lower-incbine workers,' a iowef standard deduction under the
income tax, higher income tax rates for those companies that
are not on the preferential treatment list, highe^^
alcoh'olic beverages' arid;;cigarettes arid'fewerjex!emptions
urider' tlie VAT. The'result is lively to be'that the !oyefall 'ta!x
systerii will be less prbgressivie^'or even re!gressive,' and this
will be'a cost of adopting the, iriterveri^^
'
The other choice, is ;to go for a tax systein that is neutral with
fespect to economic.choices.'.The basic argument hereis that
there is ho strong evidence that targeted incentives work,'and
so why introduce.distortions into the tax system? This strategy would involve.' broadening the tax base and ^lowering the
rate for all-taxpayers; Such:a system would tax all income at
the same rate; zero-rate exports; not penalize repatriated profits, equalize the-individual and company tax;rates arid find a
way: to; approximate: true- econoriiic* depreciationrJit might
adopt aflat-rate:incometax, but itiwould not provide prefer-:
ential treatment either to high-income individuals or to busi-;
nesses. The advaritageis that the market and not the govem-i
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ment would be allocating'the resources,(and govemments do
havea bad record of picking winners),- and the tax system
would be more fair.
^
..
. - .;'
The disadvantage is that the govemment, by'not matching the
incentives provided in the heighbouririig country, may give
the impression that thebusiness climate is not hospitable to
riew'domestic and foreign investors. Moreover,-there;is!the
question- of,- what, tb do ' about • the existing incentive • programme.'- It; may bel politically entrenched and, its removal
could have a high transaction cost; Moreover, the inarket may
long ago have'capitalized the effects of this preferential treat-?
ment. ^Blejer: and Cheasty, (1990,-; pp.; 66-^81) mention yet
another-disadvantage.- Ther adoption,of i trade liberalization
programs mayJead.tastibstantial short-mn fiscal costs; in the
form ofireduced taxreveriue and pressures.to provide subsir
diesto those individuals and companies hurt byithe reform.- \
EX"' IM//

\

There has been a worldwide reaction against the o v e r T c e n tfaHzatioh of goyemine^^^^
income countries; alike." EspeciaH
large'cbuntries^ there
has been an erosion of cphfidence in' the ability of the, central
goyemihent to'decide bh what'is ffi^^
for'each'local afea^^ahi to deliver.'that packagepf
On the tax* side.'there is a reaction against !wh^ are pefceived
to be high taxes that iafe 'hot retumed in the'form of services
yvith, identifiable global; b^^^
whether tb'pursue'it,! afeViiew^.q^^^
.hieing debated in
countries such as China and Russia, and old questions of cbncem in countries such as Colombia and Argentina.^ . L • T
•Why is,this a hardfiscal choice?. On the face of it,, it seems a
reasonable pfoppsitipn that as economic ideyeiopmentiand
urbaiiization proceed, the local level should be more invplyed
in the tax and expenditure decision-making,process.;But if
the next decade places a high.premium,on macrbecqnomic
policy to,make,developing economies more stable and,more
attractive toforeignmyestors, then central govemments need
even more conttolpver the major fiscal instmment^
Consider first the impUcations bf fiscal decentralization,, i.e.
giving more taxing pbwefs and expenditure' respbrisibiiities
to the lower.leyels of gbyeriimeht; Th'e adyaritage is that gby-.
eminent is brought closer to, tlie,people, in that they may hbw
have mbre, say in choosing the mix bf 'services they receive
and the levelof taxes they will pay.'It is also possible that
overall irevenue mobilizatibn imay. be; improved, because
some taxes are i inherently betteradministeredat the local
level (e.g. propertytaxes), andibecause therciis a substantial
untapped fiscal.capacity that lies beloWithe.cutoff point for
central; govemment .income 1 and. value tadded :taxes.-.The
instruments: of fiscal; decentralization ;are;lpcal taxpowers,
the assigninent of Jocal expenditiire responsibility and the
design of a grant system that guarantees local-governments a
claim on central resources.'Such assignments reduce the flexibility of the central goveriiment to pursue a stabilization pro-,
gramme,: to' equalize; services; ;within. the country. arid- to
implement its development spending priorities.,;-: IT :i 1 :
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The other direction is continued fiscal centralization. If, the
central govemment controls the major, instmments bf taxation, expenditure and debt; it is more able to pursue the programme of rnacroeconomic policy that is seen as so vital for
the development of Latin America in the next decade. Moreover, if budgets are to be austere, all the more reason to allow
the centre to decide on the p u ^
Ibcatio'n of infrastnicture irivestmehts! and' all; the' more reasoii to give' the centre

afearetion'to*piu^

If

education arid health expenditures are key irivestnierit areas
for growth'in the next de^
direction (if not
cehtrjd'contirbi)! oyer, these experiditiires would seerii 'criticaL
The problem is that especially large countries,'where p'opuiatibris have diverse rieeds and preiferences, arerioteasily gov-emable frorii- the centre, Central gbyerrinient biireaucfacies
brealc' bbWri," people (and'investors) becoriie'disaffected and
local-level development opportunities becbme lost. ;
'
There, are relatively few, ways out of this difficult choice. In
many; countries the local govemments have .beengiyen; only
minor iexpenditure: responsibilities, and no control, over a
broad-based tax. There has been no major attempt to invest in
their capacity to provide good government, and they have no
certain claim on central reyenues; To continue, this policy by
making minor adjustments will not be a tme move toward fiscal decentralization. In other countries (Brazil is a good
example),-• subriational govemments do have a definable
claim on total govemment revenues, and such a claim cannot
be easily backed away from in the name,of a need for greater
central control. '
, .
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The outlook for the world economy is for a resumption in real
economic growth after the dismal performance of the past two
years. Growth will be slow until the mid-1990s; but thereafter
is projected to be stronger The stmcture of this-growth,
accordmg to the average of the forecasts examined here, is for
a lower rate of inflation and a lower real rate of interest.
Overall, however, the 1990s,will not bring a real growth for
most developing and industrialized- countries that is: any
greater thanthat realized in the: 1980s, and most projections
expect it to be slightly lower. The implications of this outlook
are that, export markets in i industrialized i countries will not
grow, as fast as had been hoped, and that capital (inflows to
developing countries may be:of lesser magnitude than had
been hoped. Should a more pessimistic set of assumptions be
adopted (increases in oil prices, failure of the GATT negotiations; and a failure to bring the US biidget deficit urider contrbl), then the outlook would appear everi less favourable for
low-income couritries. ' • •
;'•
Most analysts advise lowerrincome countries to adopt a strategy, of stabilizing their economies and; restoring, the confidence of investors. This is said to be best accomplished by
trade, price and exchange rate liberalization; control of inflation by a stable money^ supply; exchange rate adjustriients;
privatization of iridustry where appropriate; arid fiscal bal8.' The subject of fiscal decentralization is reviewed in BaJil and Linn (1992),"
Chapters 12and 13. . . ;5'i • ; - ; ; : ; • ; • ' / ; - , - : - J ' ; ' ; t . , . .V ; .
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ance. It is the last area where many developing countries have \ :.'\)Open Developing Economies (Washington, D.C.: Intermade the least progress. This is partly because sorne combinational Monetary Fund, 1990).
'
nation of economic liberalization; a slow-growth world econDe la Torre, Augusto and Kelly, Margaret R., "Regional
omy and the fiscal sins of the past has put countries in the ! . Trade Arrangements," Occasional Paper No. 93 (Washposition of making some very hard fiscal choices; Among
ington, D.C.: Intematibnal Monetary Fund, 1992).
theseare:'-'
J:..;,,:;.\\.,
•:.;,,„;" V"'; V'
, .Goldstein,;Morris,'Mathieson,- Donald J. and Lane, Timothy,
Should govemment expenditure grbwth ,be capped in . / "Determinants arid Systemic Consequences of Intemaorder to control the deficit, or should taxes be increased?
tional Capital Flows," Occasional Paper No. 77 (WashShould the entire tax system be adjusted to become more ;1 ri.ington,D.C.: Intemational Monetary Fund, 1991).
investor-friendly, even at the cost of making it less pro, ! Greene, Joshua and Villanueva; Delano, "Private Investment
gressive? Should this be'done by providing special prefin Developing Countries," IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 38, No.
erences to targeted taxpayefs?
" '
1 (Washington, D.C.: Intemational Monetary Fund,
Should taxing and expenditure powers be decentralized
March
1991). ' '
' ' / ' ;-;0f D ^ ' ; - - ; T ' V .;
:
to lower-level govemments, or should centralization be
Roemer,
Michael
arid
Radelet,
Steven C , "Macroeconomic
continued?
-r.-.
oo; ;.
Reforiri in DWelopirig Couritries,'' in DwightH. Perkins
Finally, there is a more rosy'outlook - the'possibility'that'
.
and Michael Roemer, eds., ^e/(3rm/«^£c^^^
the 1990s will see a tuming point that the modellers have hbt
'* "in'Developing Coiintries (Cariibridge,' MA: Harvard
picked up. Countries have leamed the lessons of specializa, Iristitute for Intemational Development,' 1991).,;
' '
tion and gains frprn tradein the 1980s; Asian and Latin coiin-^
" Tanzi, 'Vito and Criu', ^Ke-yburig,' "Fiscal Policy'for'. Stable'
tries have made remarkable policy^adjustnients; and even the
" A n d Equitable Growth iri'Latin Ariierica,"lritemational
industrialized United,States is taking a more' outward view.'
';'
Monetary Fund Working Paper No.; WP/89/93 (1989)!"
Central economic planning is on the decline in most places,
Congressional
Budget,' Office, ,"Ari,!Analysis,of the.Presithe socialisf econbrriies' are' in transition and most industrialdent's
Budgetary
Proposals for Fiscal Year 1992" (Washized economies seem to see economic union as a better route
ington,
D.C.:
US
Govemriient Printing Office, 1991);
than competition. Technology continues to advance at a rapid
'
•
Inter-American
Development
Bank,- -Economic and Social
pace. It is a timefor innovation, and arguably a time for very
substantial economic.growth.
, •
'
,
"
Progress in Latin Americar 1991 Report (Baltimore:
•
Johns Hopkins University Press,"1991)j' • '
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